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PROBLEMS OF A WARTIME
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
L.C. Greent
Despite the courts-martial that were held in relation to the
Korean and Vietnam wars, culminating in the Calley processes,
perhaps there is still room, particularly as the number of those
with practical wartime experience is decreasing, for one who acted as a wartime attorney during the Second World War to describe some of the problems that confronted a military lawyer
who knew "some" international law (which transcended issues
relating to the law of armed conflict) during that war. It will be
understood that in some ways this paper is more personal in
style than is usually the case in an academic journal, and that
some of the issues relate to municipal, criminal or military,
rather than international law.
When I graduated-with a first class LL.B. degree from the
University of London in 1941 and I was duly conscripted into
the British Army, I had no idea that my legal studies and primary qualifications would be of much practical value during my
military service. True, public international law had been one of
my degree subjects; therefore I knew more than did my fellow
recruits. Beyond this, it did not seem that my legal knowledge
would be of great significance as a member of the King's Royal
Rifle Corps-an infantry unit. The situation seemed no different
when I was transferred into the Intelligence Corps to learn how
to translate captured Japanese documents. However, it was my
knowledge of Japanese that would determine my future as a military lawyer.
I LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C., University Professor, Honorary Professor of Law, University of Alberta; formerly, Major, Intelligence Corps (U.K.), Deputy Assistant Adjutant
General (Prosecution General), G.H.Q. (India).
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1971), aff'd, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973).
For example, that I was not allowed to ill-treat prisoners of war or civilians and
that, if captured, I was only required to give the enemy my name, regimental number
and rank.
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In the film Breaker Morant, which deals with the courtmartial of three Australian officers attached to the British forces
during the South African (Boer) War and charged with what today would be considered war crimes (namely, unlawful killing of
wounded personnel and civilians), a young solicitor with little or
no experience of criminal practice, or military law, was detailed
to defend them. Two of the accused were executed, while the
third was sentenced to a term of years and subsequently wrote
his personal account of the trial.' This practice of detailing defence officers in courts-martial still existed in the British forces
during the Second World War, although today a more permanent team of army lawyers is available. However, during the war,
an accused could be defended by a completely unqualified "prisoner's friend."'
In contrast to the defence, the prosecution would in many
cases be undertaken by a qualified lawyer, unless he was held at
the front. At trial, judges would be drawn from among officers of
an equal or higher rank than the accused, and it was almost certain that none of them would have had any legal training. These
officers would normally be members of the regular forces or
would have seen action and they would be assisted by a legally
qualified officer, the Judge Advocate. His task was to explain the
law, sum up the evidence and act as legal advisor to the tribunal.
When necessary, the Judge Advocate would act as legal advisor
to the defending officer as well. While he would not participate
in the tribunal's deliberations, he would remain available to provide any further legal advice or interpretation that the "judges"
might need." At that time, though the matter is now different by
virtue of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act,6 there was no appeal
to any higher tribunal, although the sentence had to be confirmed by the convening officer (the senior officer who had ordered the trial to be instituted), who would have played no role
inthe proceedings.
The Indian Army was governed by its own statutes and the
G. WITTON, SCAPEGOATS OF THE EMPIRE (1907).
See His MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW 48 (1929)(hereinafter MANUAL).

See Griffith, Justice and the Army, 10

MOD.

L. REV. 292, 293-98 (1947).

6 Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, ch. 46.
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tribunals established under the Indian Army Act 7 were obliged
to apply the Indian Penal Code8 and the Indian Rules of Evidence' and Criminal Procedure."' However, the organization of
the Indian Army's courts-martial were virtually the same as
those applicable to the British forces. This became relevant
when British forces in Burma started capturing members of the
Indian National Army (INA). This Army had been raised by the
Japanese, through the use of Indian military and civilian propagandists and captured personnel. It was recruited from large
numbers of Indian Army prisoners of war captured in Hong
Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Burma. The ideology underlying
this "Army" and the "Provisional Government of Free India" to
which it was subordinated by the Japanese was the independence of India. The personnel involved were led to believe they
were an ally of the Japanese who would help them to free India
from British rule." In fact, the Japanese did agree to the appointment of a Major-General in the INA, a former LieutenantColonel in the Indian Medical Service, as Governor of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which had been "liberated" from the
British. Had this officer when taken prisoner continued to serve
in a purely medical capacity, rather than in a political role dependent upon his captors, he probably would have done nothing
of a criminal character.1 2 With the capture of such former mem7 Indian Army Act, 1911, Official Publication Number V8-66. This resource is available at the India Office-Library and Records, 197 Black Friars Road, London, England,
SE1 8NG; telephone number, 81-928-9531.
" INDIA PEN. CODE (1860) reprinted in K. CHAKRAVARTI, CRIMINAL MAJOR ACTS 476
(1985).
" INDIA R. Ev1D. (1872) reprinted in CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 775.
.0 INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. (1898) reprinted in CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 1.
" For one discussion concerning the origin of INA aims, see Green, Indian National
Army Trials, 11 MOD. L. REv. 47 (1949); see, also, B. DESAI, I.N.A. DEFENCE (1946).
" See Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armies in the Field, 27 July, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303, reprinted in D.
SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, 325 (1988). Art. 12(c) states:
"Pending their return [medical personnel] shall continue to carry out their duties under
the direction of the enemy; they shall preferably be engaged in the care of the wounded
and sick of the belligerent to which they belong" (emphasis added). Id. at 328-29. See
also Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust Co., 15 F.2d 872 (N.D. Cal, 1926), in which it was
held that a German doctor residing in the United States who went to Germany and
served as a doctor in the German Red Cross during World War I was not an "enemy...
in any proper sense of that term," since he was not considered part of the military forces.
Id. at 874.

3

PACE Y.B. INT'L L.

[Vol. 2:93

bers of the British Indian Army, the military authorities decided
to institute courts-martial, charging among other offences,
"Waging War Against the King," the name by which treason was
described in the Indian Penal Code.1"
I.
On one occasion my commanding officer, an expert in translating Japanese, was called upon to translate a portion of a diary
which referred to one of the INA accused. Having virtually destroyed the case for the prosecution by stating that no Englishman could really be considered an "expert" in so far as the Japanese language was concerned, he was asked if he knew of any
young officer who might be able to defend such personnel in future trials. He replied that he had among his staff a young lieutenant who held a legal degree and who knew all about the Indian National Army from his work as a translator of captured
documents. He, of course, did not point out that this officer had
gone straight from law school into the Army, had never appeared in court and was a graduate in English law!
Shortly thereafter, I was called upon to defend two Indian
non-commissioned officers, a naik (corporal) and a lance-naik (a
lance-corporal), who were charged as members of the Indian National Army with waging war against the King-a capital offence. I stated that although I was perfectly willing to undertake
this task, there were a number of problems. In the first place, I
explained that I did not speak Urdu, the language of the Indian
Army, or for that matter any other Indian dialect. Since neither
of the accused spoke English, I would have to depend upon the
services of an interpreter. I was assured that a competent translator would be available. Next, I pointed out that I had taken
English criminal law in my examinations, based on Kenny's
Outlines,'4 supplemented by Harris, 5 and that I had never even
looked at the Indian Penal Code, let alone the Indian Code of
Criminal Procedure. Moreover, I had not even studied procedure
" INDIA

PEN.

CODE

Ch. 6, §121 accompanying

CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 551.
14 C.S. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW

used in English law schools.
11 S.F. HARRIS, PRINCIPLES

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5

notes (1860), reprinted in

(1904). This was the basic textbook then-

OF THE CRIMINAL LAW

(1912).
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as one of my degree subjects. This did not seem to present any
problems to the Adjutant General's Department which was responsible for organizing the trials. I was assured that the two
Codes and any textbooks I might need would be given to me,
and that as a "qualified lawyer" I would have no difficulty in
"mugging up" all the law I would need to carry out my task as
defending officer. Finally, I pointed out that the Indian Manual
of Military Law was different from the British Manual,16 which
was the only one available in the Translation Section's office
where I worked. In any case, I had not as yet had any occasion
to consult it. Once again, I was assured that a volume would be
provided and that I would have no difficulty. Bolstered by these
assurances as to my competence, I agreed to undertake the
defence."
Having agreed to undertake the defence, I was presented
with a copy of the charge sheet setting out the offences charged,
together with the summary of the evidence which had been prepared by the prosecutor in the presence of the accused. The accused had heard the statements made by the witnesses to be
called by the prosecution, whom they had been able to question,
together with their own statements made in the absence of any
defending officer. I visited my clients, explained my difficulties
to them and asked whether they had any objection to my appearing for them. They were so pleased to have anybody defend
them that it did not worry them that I was young-only 23-a
British officer, almost certainly out of sympathy with their ideology, and completely lacking any court experience. I did explain,
however, that I had now secured from the Prosecution Section of
General Headquarters, India, copies of the two Codes, the Indian Manual and a copy of Ratanlal's book on the Indian Law
8
of Crimes."
The two men were charged with Committing a Civil Offence
"eSee

MANUAL, supra note 4.

When I eventually saw the film Breaker Morant, I could appreciate from personal
experience the difficulties that faced the defending officer in that case, although I was
never faced with a tribunal which appeared to be completely under the influence of the
Commander-in-Chief.
15 RATANLAL & T. DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF CRIMES (22nd ed. 1971). This was the
leading Indian work on the Penal Code at the time.
"
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contrary to § 41 of the Indian Army Act, 1911,'" the offence in
question being Waging War Against the King contrary to § 121
of the Indian Penal Code, 20 which carried a penalty of death,
transportation for life, or even a fine. According to the Indian
Law Commission, the words "waging war against the King"
"seem naturally to import a levying of war by one who, throwing
off the duty of allegiance, arrays himself in open defiance of his
Sovereign in like manner as a foreign enemy would do, ' '2 1 and
"waging" is used in the same sense as is "levying" in the English

Treason Act of

1350.22

According to Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, "an assembly armed
and arrayed in warlike manner for any treasonable purpose is
bellum levatum, though not bellum percussum. Lifting and
marching are sufficient overt acts without committing to a battle
or action. ' 23 No specified number of persons is required, and any
individual found carrying arms on behalf of the enemy may be
charged with waging war contrary to § 121 of the Indian Penal
Code.24
The accused agreed that when captured they had been in
uniform and carrying rifles given to them by the Japanese. They
were supposed to use these weapons if they came upon any
member of the British forces while gathering information behind
the British lines, which they had easily infiltrated in view of
their uniforms and appearance. Unfortunately, they still had in
"

Indian Army Act, 1911, § 41, supra note 7.

20 INDIA PEN. CODE §

121 (1860) states: "Whoever wages war against the government

of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine." Reprinted in
CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 550.
10.
21 INDIAN LAW COMMISSION SECOND REPORT ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1847,
22 Id. at 9, citing the Statute of Treason, 1350, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, ch. 2.
'3 See RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, supra note 18, at 282.
24 It
is of interest to compare these definitions with the statement in Black's Law
Dictionary:
Levying War. In criminal law, the assembling of a body of men for the purpose
of effecting by force a treasonable object; and all who perform any part, however
minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are leagued in the
general conspiracy, are considered as engaged in levying war, within the meaning
of the constitution.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (6th ed. 1990) (citing U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3 which provides: "(1) Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."). Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5
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their possession the Indian Army identity discs which had been
issued to them upon their enlistment when they had taken an
oath of allegiance to the Crown. Arguing that they were simple
soldiers in Japanese hands acting under duress, I put in a plea of
not guilty, and I pointed out that they had joined the INA after
the British surrender at Singapore. At that time, General Perceval as Commander-in-Chief had effected the surrender and instructed all Indian Army personnel to obey any orders given to
them by the Japanese. Although this instruction was issued for
their protection, the larger number of Indian personnel involved
took it to mean that it included the Japanese order that they
were now embodied in the Indian National Army, to which a
new oath of allegiance was taken. From the point of view of international law, prisoners of war retain that status throughout
their captivity, as may be seen in the decision of the British Military Court in the Gozawa Trial.25 In the Gozawa Trial, the defence had contended that all Indian prisoners had become members of the INA and as such subsidiary units of the Japanese
Army, they were subject to its discipline. While a prisoner of war
might seek to join the armed forces of his captor, it should be
noted that this is now almost certainly forbidden by the Prisoners of War Convention of 1949.2 Article 130 states that "compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile
Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in this Convention ' '2 constitutes a
grave breach and, as such, is a war crime. In the case of the Indian National Army, duress of the most extreme kind was resorted to, including corporal punishment, torture and the like,
while the Gozawa case indicated that no legal process was undertaken prior to the execution of a prisoner.28 Moreover, under
Article 7, "prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce
in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Convention," 9 and should they become members of the captor's
force they obviously lose all the rights postulated in the Conven-

"

C.

SLEEMAN, THE GOZAWA TRIAL

(1945) (1948).

2 Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 Aug., 1949,

reprintedin SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 12, at 423.
27 Id. at 476.
28 See SLEEMAN, supra note 25.
28 SCHINDLER

& TOMAN, supra note 12, at 432 (emphasis added).
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tion for the protection of prisoners.3 0
Despite the efforts of the defending officer, it is perhaps not
a matter of surprise that the two accused were found guilty and
duly sentenced to death. However, my connection with my clients was not over. About two weeks after the trial, the prosecuting officer telephoned and inquired whether he should pick me
up the following morning at 7 a.m. When I asked why this was
being suggested, he asked, "Don't you want to see your clients
hang?" I declined the offer, insisting that this was beyond my
duties as defending officer, particularly as my clients had made
no such request. Subsequently, I asked an acquaintance in the
American military legal service for his views on this matter. He
maintained that it had been my duty to attend the execution by
arguing that Oliver Wendell Holmes considered it the duty of
the defence to ensure that the method of execution was indeed
that prescribed by law. He was not impressed by my contention
that this was the task of the Governor of the jail, the doctor in
attendance and any minister of religion present at the execution.
II.
Having proved my competence as a defending officer to the
satisfaction of the legal authorities at General Headquarters, I
was ordered to repeat the performance in a case in which my
"schoolboy" knowledge of international law became significant.
Just as members of the Indian Army captured by the Japanese
joined them by way of the Indian National Army, so too military
personnel captured in Burma formed the Burmese National
Army (BNA) under the command of Aung San who abandoned
the Japanese as military fortunes in Burma changed. Aung San
attached himself to the advancing British army, and became the
first ruler of independent Burma. On this occasion it was a
member of the BNA who became my client. Among the units
left behind in Burma when the British withdrew was the Burma
Frontier Force, subject for disciplinary purposes to the Burma
Frontier Force Act.3" This Force was more in the nature of a

30

See H.

LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT

79-80 (1978).

Burma Frontier Force Act, 1937, Official Publication Number V8-223. This document is available directly from the India Office-Library and Records, 197 Black Friars
Road, London, England, SE1 8NG; telephone number, 81-928-9531.
"

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5
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police than a military force, so that employment of its members
as police officers by the Japanese would not in any way be in
breach of the duties of an occupant. In accordance with Article
43 of the Hague Regulations: 2
[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures
in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order
unless absolutely prevented, the laws
and safety, while respecting,
33
in force in the country.
There was probably no better way to do this than through the
existing police force. Should the members of the police force
merely carry out the duties they normally performed and in no
way go beyond this by co-operating with the occupant, it might
be difficult to argue that any treasonable or other illegal act had
been performed, particularly if there had been nothing like an
oath of allegiance to the occupant. In similar fashion, consequent to the unilateral declaration of independence by the
Smith regime in Rhodesia, the British authorities instructed the
judiciary3 4 to continue to function and enforce the legislative
measures of the revolutionary administration so long as these
did not exceed the powers granted to the former legitimate
Rhodesian administration under the Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act, 35 as amended by the Southern Rhodesia Act.36
However, the position with regard to the Burma Frontier
Force was complicated when, after its withdrawal, the Government of Burma established itself in Simla, India. The Governor,
in accordance with the Burma Army Act, 1937,'3 issued a Notifi" Annex to Hague Convention IV on the Laws and Customs of Warfare on Land, 18
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 12, at 75.

Oct., 1907, reprintedin

" Id. at 88.
" Statement by Prime Minister Wilson in the House of Commons. See Mr. Wilson
Emphasizes Need For Effective Action Quickly, Times (London), 13 Nov., 1965, at 7,
col. 5. For a description of these events, see Green, Southern Rhodesian Independence,

14 ARcHIv

DES VOLKERRECHTS

155, 163-66 (1969). See also The King v. Maung Hmin et.

al 13 Ann. Dig. 334 (Burma High Court of Judicature 1946); Maung Hli Maung v. Ko
Maung Maung 13 Ann. Dig. 344 (Burma High Court (Appellate Civil) 1946)(post-liberation Burmese cases recognizing validity of judicial decisions of Burmese courts and Burmese judges functioning during Japanese occupation).
" Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Act, 1961, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, ch. 2.
6 Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, ch. 76.
" Burma Army Act, 1911, Official Publication Number V8-221. This document is
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cation subjecting the Burma Frontier Force to the Burma Army
Act, thus making it liable to Burmese military law, which for all
intents and purposes was the same as that prevailing in the Indian Army. Under section 5 of the Act, "the Governor may, by
notification, apply all or any of the provisions of this Act to any
force raised and maintained under the authority of the Governor."3 8 Section 41 of the Burma Army Act 39 was expressed in
identical terms with the same section of the Indian Army Act"'
so that the charges were again Waging War Against the King.
The accused in this case had been only 19 at the time of the
Government's withdrawal from Burma and was an ordinary sepoy' 1 enjoying no rank of any kind. Again, the defence had to be
conducted through an interpreter, this time it was one who
spoke Burmese as well as Urdu, the lingua franca42 of both the
Indian and Burmese forces. The evidence against my client was
somewhat different from that in the previous case. He was not in
uniform, he had been captured behind British lines dressed as a
civilian and he was in possession of a document in Japanese certifying him to be a member of the Hikari Kikan. Since I was
originally employed as a Japanese translator, the prosecuting officer asked me if I would translate this document for him. This
proved a simple matter, and I asked him if he was aware of the
nature of the Hikari Kikan. It was in fact an underground intelligence organization somewhat similar to the British Force 136
which had been left behind in Burma, or the American OSS. "s
He assured me that he was aware of its character and I reminded him that at some stage he should bring this to the notice
of the court, for as defending officer this was not my duty. The
court was presided over by a permanent president" who had

available at the India Office-Library and Records, 197 Black Friars Road, London, England, SE1 8NG; telephone number 81-928-9531.
"' Id. at § 5.
" Id. at § 41.
" Indian Army Act, 1911, § 41, supra note 7.
" This was the lowest rank in the Indian Forces, which was equivalent to a private.
42 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 760 (Morris ed.
1975). "2. Any hybrid language used as a medium of communication between peoples of
different languages." Id.
" The American Office of Strategic Services was the predecessor of the current Central Intelligence Agency.
" In the British forces at that time it was not uncommon for a senior officer of long

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5
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been in the Army some thirty years, while the Judge Advocate
was a young newly qualified Indian officer. Because this was his
first case, I suppose that now I would probably agree that from
his point of view, the line of defence I put forward was completely unfair.
Basing my argument on my knowledge of international law,
the difference between civil and military administration and the
rights and duties of the police, I contended that the court had
no jurisdiction of a criminal character since it was not illegal for
a police officer to obey the commands of the occupying authority
so long as they related to "public order and safety" as provided
by the Hague Regulations.' 5 Relying completely on my memory
as a student, I further contended that as a police officer serving
in that capacity under the occupying authority, it was permissible for him to "take an oath of obedience, but not of allegiance.""' It came as no surprise when, accepting the advice of
the Judge Advocate, the President of the court ruled that this
contention was really a substantive defence to the charge rather
than a plea to the jurisdiction. This, however, did not deter me
and I then put forward a more confident plea that the tribunal
lacked jurisdiction. This time I presented a variety of grounds
that had nothing to do with the criminality or otherwise of the
actions of the accused. While recognizing the validity of the
maxim ignorantia juris neminem excusat,17 it was submitted
that this was not irrebuttable. The court was reminded that the
Burma Frontier Force had been brought within the terms of the
Burma Army Act' 8 subsequent to the fall of Myitkyina, the city
of Burma in which the accused had been serving and in which he

service to be appointed as a permanent president of courts-martial. This avoided the
constant use of officers lacking any experience of the conduct of courts-martial.
" Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct.,
1907, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 12, at 69.
" 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 445 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952):
[The occupant] must not compel [local functionaries] by force to carry on their
functions during occupation, if they refuse to do so, except where military necessity for the carrying on of a certain function arises. If they are willing to serve
under him, he may make them take an oath of obedience, but not of
allegiance . ..
Id.

' "Ignorance of law excuses no one."
"'

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 747 (6th ed. 1990).

Burma Army Act, 1911, supra note 37.
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had been left behind when the administration withdrew. This
meant the accused would have been unaware of the change in
his legal status and would have had no means of becoming aware
of such change. Moreover, the court was reminded of the principle in Roman law that recognizes that ignorance of the law may
be put forward as a defence on behalf of minors, women and
soldiers. 9
In addition, it was submitted that in accordance with the
doctrine of postliminium,50 the accused's legal status could not
be adversely altered while he was in enemy hands; therefore, legislation purporting to make him subject to military law and the
penalties attaching thereto could not apply. These arguments
proved too much for the Judge Advocate. He indicated that
since we were now in the realm of international law, it might be
proper for the President of the court to invite the Judge Advocate General's representative5 to hear and, if necessary, contest
these arguments. I raised no objection and suggested that the
case might well be .covered by the principle laid down in Rex v.
19 2 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN Book XXII, ch. 6,
9 (Mommsen, Krueger & Watson
ed. 1985). Roman law was then a subject of study for the London LL.B. examinations.
But see, Rotterdam Bank Ltd. (Robaver) v. Nederlandsch Beheers-Instituut, 16 I.L.R.
428 (Holland, Supreme Court 1950); Damhof v. State of the Netherlands, 16 I.L.R. 429
(Holland, District Court of the Hague 1947, Court of Appeal of the Hague 1949, Supreme
Court 1950); Landelijke Hypotheekbank Ltd. v. Receiver of Taxes for Amsterdam, 16
I.L.R. 430 (Holland, District Court of Amsterdam 1949, Supreme Court 1950). These
decisions of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands upheld the validity in The Netherlands of legislation enacted by the Government in Exile in London. The publication of
the Royal Decree in London was held to be valid when it could not be published in The
Netherlands. Cf. In re Anthoine, 11 Ann. Dig. 273 (Belgium, Court of Appeal of Brussels
1940) for text of Belgian decree:
If as a result of military operations, an official or functionary . . . is unable to
communicate with his superior authorities, upon whom he depends, or if these
authorities have ceased to function, he exercises all the functions of these authorities within the framework of his professional activities and in so far as urgent
needs require it.
Id.

"

THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN

(Sandars trans. 1900), Bk. I, ch. xii, § 5:

[If an ascendant is taken prisoner, although he becomes the slave of the enemy,
yet his paternal power is only suspended, owing to the jus postliminii; for captives, when they return, are restored to all their former rights. Thus, on his return,
the father will have his children in his power: for the postliminium supposes jhat
the captive has never been absent.
Id. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 46, at 616-20.
l The Judge Advocate General is the head of the Army Legal Service and is represented in each command area by an officer so designated.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5
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Bailey.5 2 The headnote to this case reads:
[A] prisoner was indicted for maliciously shooting; the offence
was within a few weeks after the 39 Geo. 3, ch. 37 (a) passed, and
before notice of it could have reached the place where the offence
was committed. On case, the Judges thought he could not have
been tried if the 39 Geo. 3, ch. 37 had not passed, and as he could
not know of that Act, they thought it right he should have a
pardon."
It is not clear what the Judge Advocate General's representative
thought of this argument, for he informed the court that responsibility for deciding whether any plea to the jurisdiction was
valid or not was within the sole competence of the Judge Advocate at the trial in question. At this point, the latter asked for an
adjournment so that "I may communicate with my gods," and
they apparently instructed him to reject the plea and proceed
with the case.
Once the prosecution opened the substantive case against
the accused, the prosecuting officer presented the Hikari Kikan
pass, together with a certified translation as an official exhibit.
The President asked if the defending officer had seen the translation and whether he accepted it as authentic. On being assured
that this was indeed the case, the President asked who had
made the translation and the atmosphere in the courtroom was
somewhat electric when the prosecutor replied, "The defending
officer, sir." At this juncture, the President checked my credentials and noted that I was an officer with the Translation Section. Despite our earlier discussion as to the nature of the Hikari
Kikan, the prosecutor failed to inform the court of its true underground character, so the accused benefitted from the court's
assumption that this was merely another Japanese unit. While
the accused was found guilty, it appears that my earlier arguments concerning jurisdiction had borne some fruit, for the sentence in this instance was one of transportation for life, rather
than death. Because the Burmese National Army, under the
command of Aung San, changed loyalties, participated in the ulRex v. Richard Bailey, Russ. & Ry. 1 (1800).
Id. "On case" is the English process by which a case was stated by one court and
referred to a panel of judges for an opinion. The case involved a prosecution under The
Offences at Sea Act, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 37.
,'
3
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timate attack on Rangoon and was able to secure Burma's independence in 1947, my client spent a mere two years in jail.
As a result of this particular decision and the manner in
which the defence had been presented, the Prosecution Section
changed its view of my usefulness as a defending officer. A request was submitted by the commanding officer of that Section
for my official transfer from the Japanese Translation Section to
the Prosecution Section. As an academic teacher of law, I have
found this experience of appearing both as a defending and
prosecuting officer in the same type of case a useful example to
use when explaining defending counsel's ability to appear on behalf of a client in whose innocence he has the gravest doubts.
III.
In the British Army during the Second World War it was
not uncommon to assume that if an officer was or appeared to be
competent in a particular aspect of a specialised branch of the
service, he must clearly be competent in every subspecialty of
that branch. Therefore, it was not surprising that while awaiting
my transfer to the Prosecution Section I was called upon to act
as the defending officer in an ordinary court-martial of a young
officer. This case had nothing to do with either international law
or the law of war; it involved charges that might be presented
against a military officer either in peace or war.
Lieutenant L. left England and had been in India about ten
days. I was informed that he was now under close arrest." The
summary of evidence sent to me disclosed that while on duty
outside New Delhi's leading hotel, after malaria time,5 a lancecorporal" in the Military Police felt something pressed into the
small of his back and he was told "Reach for the sky, I'm
' When under close arrest, a person must be under constant surveillance by his
escort. It is distinct from open arrest, which permits the accused to move about freely
within the camp area. See MANUAL, supra note 4, at 31.
"5After dusk, malarial mosquitoes became a serious problem, and male military personnel were under orders to wear long pants and long-sleeved shirts and jackets. While it
was an offence to become sick by one's own wrongdoing, as the contracting of malaria
contrary to the dress order would have been, female personnel were not so restricted and
were able to continue to wear short sleeves, no stockings and even backless gowns.
" The lowest non-commissioned rank in the British Army.
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Lemmy Caution!"57 He was somewhat surprised to find a British
officer wearing shorts and shirt-sleeve order standing with two
fingers forming a "gun." He told the lieutenant not to be foolish
and to go home. This apparently upset L., who knocked the
M.P.'s cap off, and as the latter bent to retrieve it, L. "rabbit
punched" 58 him. At this juncture, the M.P. thought he had best
send for the Provost Marshal,5 9 who arrived to find that L. had
now wandered back into the hotel where he was happily flicking
cigarettes from the mouth of any officer or civilian he came
across. Fortunately they were tolerant and assumed that he
must have been inebriated and lodged no complaint. However,
the Provost Marshal saw things in a different light. He and his
Deputy, who accompanied him, seized L., and without telling
him he was under arrest,60 they frogmarched him from the hotel
and "placed" him in a military police truck that was waiting
outside. At the subsequent trial there was some difference of
opinion as to the "gentleness" with which this action was conducted. On returning to his tent, L. became sick and was permitted to obtain a handkerchief from his uniform trunk. He did so,
and at the same time confronted the two military police officers
with a pistol. This was wrested from him and he was "placed"
on his cot. The camp sergeant major was in the next tent and
later testified that he went to L.'s tent to investigate what was
happening because he had heard a "thud, as of a sack of potatoes being thrown down." L. was left under close arrest in the
charge of another lieutenant-a rather strange procedure because normally the escort of an officer under close arrest should
be senior to that officer. During the night the escort awoke to a
noise. He found that L. was turning on his cot and placing his
head at its foot. He explained the reason for this by saying that
in this way "the 'wog' who wants to stab me through the tent
window will miss." 61

" He was the hero of Peter Cheney's novels, which were extremely popular during
World War II.
1s THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1074 (Mottid ed.
1975). "A chopping blow to the back of the neck." Id.
' Senior Military Police Officer.
40 Under English military law, an officer must be informed that he is about to be
arrested and the reason therefore. See MANUAL, supra note 4, at 31.
"' Originally Royal Air Force slang, dating from about 1930, which was soon adopted
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The charge sheet accompanying the summary of evidence
opened by charging L. with an offence under § 16 of the English
Army Act,62 with conduct "unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman"-a charge invariably brought at every
court-martial of an officer. The charge sheet proceeded to list a
series of offences contrary to the dress order; assault of a military policeman; drunkenness; threatening the Provost Marshal
with a pistol-in fact, I had the feeling that my client was
charged with everything but murder and treason! When I visited
him to discuss his defence, he informed me that he had already
been in touch with his former commanding officer in England
who had sent a cable in reply. This simply stated: "The last time
this happened to you, you danced on the piano in the mess." I
was able to persuade him that this was unlikely to be of much
assistance in his defence. I asked what had happened. Apparently, soon after disembarking in Karachi he had suffered a mild
attack of dysentery, from which he was still suffering when he
moved to Delhi for posting to the front. He spent a day or two
recuperating, during which he had read a couple of Cheney
novels. The day of the incident was his first day out and he had
visited the bar of the hotel for a drink. He was unaccustomed to
heavy drinking, he had never before tasted Indian gin and the
one sold at that particular hotel possessed a "kick" like that of
the hind leg of a mule. He could not recall how many drinks he
had consumed, but he stated that he had reached the bar at
about 11 a.m. and remembered picking himself up off the floor
of the gentlemen's lavatory at about 5:30 p.m. I assumed that he
must have drunk a half-bottle or more.
Things looked bad and I saw little chance of any successful
defence. I told L. that as I assessed the situation, he would be
lucky if he were only cashiered 8 and then immediately conscripted as a private. I suggested that it might be a good idea if
he were to write a letter resigning his commission on health
grounds if we could get a psychiatrist's report to support him. L.

by the Army, to signify a "Westernised Oriental Gentleman," particularly an Indian and
soon extended to cover any "native." 2 PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF SLANG AND UNCONVENTIONAL ENGLISH, 1353 (1961).
6 English Army Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., ch. 58, §16.
"' The is the cancellation of an officer's commission and his dismissal from the
forces with ignominy.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol2/iss1/5

16

1990]

WARTIME LAWYER

maintained that he was not mentally unsound, but eventually
accepted my contention that a psychiatrist's report that he was
somewhat imaginative and easily disassociated from reality did
not in any way adversely affect his reputation. However, it might
suggest that he was unlikely to be a suitable officer for action
under fire. He asked for time to consider this proposal. On leaving L., I went across to the Prosecution Section and asked if I
might discuss the case with my commanding officer-to-be. Having read the summary of evidence he asked what line of defence
I proposed, and he was fully in agreement with the suggestion
that L. must resign his commission. The colonel was somewhat
intrigued when I said that on the basis of such a letter I proposed pleading to the jurisdiction on the ground that he was no
longer subject to military law.
With L.'s agreement to submit his resignation, I contacted
the Command psychiatrist and asked him to see my client. He
explained that this could only be done at the request of the patient's commanding officer. The latter was not cooperative. He
explained that L. was not really under his command in the normal sense, but was only in a holding capacity while he was under
close arrest awaiting trial. There was no way that he would
authorise a psychiatric examination. I again approached the psychiatrist who agreed that he would be prepared to attend as a
defense witness but not as an expert. L. visited him, and I received a report indicating that he was perfectly sane but highly
imaginative, and that having often played in amateur theatricals
he frequently saw himself as the hero of any book he was reading (hence the identification with Lemmy Caution). I did not
think that anything would be gained by calling the psychiatrist
as a witness, particularly because I was hoping to stop the trial
in limine.
The tribunal was composed of five officers on leave from the
front, and it was presided over by a major rather than the permanent President. I immediately pleaded the lack of jurisdiction. I contended that if the resignation was accepted L. would
no longer be under military administration, and he would therefore be immune from trial by court-martial. The Judge Advocate
pointed out that L. was still in the army, that the resignation
would not be retroactive and that, in any case, civilians in the
Headquarters (India) Command Area were liable to military
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trial. He therefore rejected the plea and the trial proceeded. We
pleaded guilty to the § 41 and drunkenness charges, but we
pleaded not guilty to all of the others. From the prosecution's
point of view the trial was almost a comedy of errors. The lancecorporal who had been the victim of the assault had been
posted, which resulted in an adjournment pending his recall.
Under cross-examination he conceded that L. was totally drunk
and that, far from being intentional assaults, both the removal
of his cap and the rabbit punch could have been caused by the
wild arm-flailings of a drunken individual. When the Provost
Marshal gave his evidence it transpired that his account of
"placing" L. in the truck differed rather from the lance-corporal's recollection of the same incident. He further denied that he
had signed any documents in relation to L.'s arrest. Fortunately,
I had in my possession the receipt he had signed for the pistol
which he had left with the escort officer. In fact, both he and the
escort would have been in breach of Army Regulations had no
such receipt been handed over. The Provost Marshal was followed by his Deputy, and his examination-in-chief produced evidence that was somewhat out of line with that of his superior.
Before cross-examination could take place, the luncheon adjournment was announced. I immediately asked for the witness
to be kept incommunicado during the interval. The prosecutor
objected vehemently until the Judge Advocate asked whether he
was anxious for the defending officer to show during cross-examination that the witness had changed his story after talking to
his commander. The objection was withdrawn, and the witness
lunched with the President of the court.
On returning to the courtroom after lunch I had to pass by
the office of the Military Police. I heard someone say: "There
goes the little bastard that's gunning for our officers." I thought
it wise to mention this to the Judge Advocate who duly informed the President. The latter opened the afternoon's proceedings by requesting attendance by the entire Provost personnel. He told them that "the defending officer is employed by the
Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., and it would be wise if the Provost
Corps bore this in mind." I then informed the court that during
the interval, and in light of the evidence, L., acting on my advice, had now written a further letter withdrawing his earlier
resignation of his commission. The fact that the tribunal was not
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composed of the permanent members of a court-martial and
that they were younger and on leave from active service might
have made them somewhat more sympathetic to L. than might
otherwise have been the case. L. was found guilty of the two
charges to which he had so pleaded, and he was acquitted of all
the other charges. He was given a severe reprimand, and a report of the reprimand would be placed upon his service record,
which would probably delay any promotion. The Provost Marshal was told that he was never again to personally arrest an
officer, while his Deputy was posted to Burma. L. felt we had
won!
Thus ended my role as a defending officer. From then on I
was employed by the Prosecution Section and, in addition to
gathering evidence, I was more likely to prosecute than to defend. Moreover, in the future I would again be concerned with
war law and the status of former prisoners of the Japanese.
IV.
The first case I was instructed to prosecute concerned the
Commandant of the INA punishment camp together with his
deputy. They had been captured when Rangoon was relieved
and we possessed a great deal of evidence that they had boasted
of being in the INA. In fact, the Commandant was a shaven Sikh
who always announced that as a result he now "even looked like
a Japanese." His new appearance made it difficult to secure
much direct evidence against him, since a number of witnesses
were no longer able to recognise him. A similar problem arises in
connection with war crime trials held forty or more years after
the end of hostilities. However, he was quite happy to acknowledge that he was indeed who we said he was. Evidence showed
that both of the accused had been personally involved in recruiting propaganda on behalf of the INA, they had severely beaten
resisters and had opened fire on a Gurkha camp. The personnel
of the camp had maintained that since they came from the independent state of Nepal, they saw no reason to join a Japanesesponsored force to fight for the independence of India, which
they regarded as a foreign, if friendly, state. During this firing
incident, some of the detainees were killed while others were so
seriously injured that limbs had to be amputated.
In gathering evidence for this trial, I had one or two inter-
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esting experiences. One of my witnesses was a subedar-major1 4
in the Bahawalpur Infantry,6 who was a Muslim. After the surrender he had taken the entire regiment into a mosque and reminded them that they had once taken the oath of allegiance to
the English king. While they were in the mosque he had made
them repeat this oath. Another was a Gurkha subedar-major
who, we had been told, had been instructed by his captors to
execute his British commander. He was presented with a Japanese sword to enable him to do this. Far from doing so, he was
reported to have used this sword to decapitate the Japanese officer in question, and his picture now hung in a place of honour
in his regimental mess. The Japanese officer assured me that he
was very much alive and that the story was typical of those
fabrications that one often comes across in the armed forces. He
was perfectly willing to give evidence as a prosecution witness,
but he pointed out that he had been a prisoner since 1942, he
had been away from home for some three years before that, and
he would like to have some leave before coming to Delhi. He told
me that the Nepalese knew that his regiment had been liberated, and he feared that if he did not go home they would assume he was a traitor. I assured him that my colonel would send
a telegram to his home telling his people that he was loyal and
that he was staying in Delhi to give evidence against the INA.
His reply astounded me: "Major, sahib, I am a subedar-major in
the British forces;6 6 my brother is a subedar-major; two of my
sons are subedars; do you think they will believe an army telegram?" I feared I had no answer.
On one occasion I had to go to Lucknow to take statements
from personnel who had been liberated and repatriated to the
base there. At the time, my wife was an officer in the Women's
Royal Indian Navy. She was in uniform, and she accompanied
" In the Indian Army, officers were commissioned either by the King (KCOs) or the
Viceroy (VCOs), as his local representative. VCOs were, in hierarchical order, jemadars,
subedars and subedar-majors.
05 Bahawalpur was a native state in India in treaty relations with the British crown.
See Sayce v. Ameer Ruler Sadig Mohammad Abassi Bahawalpur State, [1952] 1 All E.R.
326, K.B., dff'd [1952] 2 Q.B. 390, C.A. Such states frequently raised their own forces,
which were invariably attached to the regular Indian Army, particularly during time of
war.
60 Gurkhas have traditionally been recruited in Nepal to serve as separate regiments
with the British forces, and not always with the Indian Army.
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me as my secretary. One of the witnesses was making a statement when he stated that he had been "abused." On being
asked what this meant, the interpreter refused to explain. In response to my urging, he stated that the witness had used a "bad
word" which he was not prepared to translate in the presence of
the "mem-sahib." It made no difference that, as I pointed out,
the mem-sahib was an officer who was on duty. Eventually he
did say that the witness had been called a "haramzada." My
wife knew some Hindustani, and I asked her if she knew this
word. All she could say was that she knew it was a word not
used in polite society. Eventually the eyes of the interpreter lit
up as he proudly announced: "Sir, he called him a man who has
no father." He seemed somewhat shaken when I commented,
"Oh, he called him a bastard." The witness himself was not impressed when I explained that such verbal abuse hardly
amounted to an offence against the Indian Army Act or to a war
crime. During the same interview, another witness stated that
the accused had beaten him with the handle of a pickaxe, only
to have the accused boast that had this happened he would have
killed the witness, and he was prepared to demonstrate the truth
of this remark either before me or during his trial.
V.
Before this case came to trial, my Colonel in the Prosecution Section was to appear in a case involving three senior officers, two of whom had achieved the rank of Major General in
the INA, while the other was a Colonel. One of the accused was
a Muslim, the second a Hindu and the third a Sikh. The case
was considered of such significance that the prosecution was to
be led by the Advocate-General of India. 7 The defence was led
by Mr. Bulabhai Desai, probably India's then-greatest advocate,"8 assisted by a group of top-flight lawyers. In fact, even
Nehru put on his gown and occasionally sat among the defence
lawyers. It was clear, therefore, that this trial 9 was going to be
reported in India as a great political event involving claims that
" The leading counsel for the government, though not a member thereof.
" For the text of his closing address, see DESAI, supra note 11.
" See
FORT).

Two

HISTORIC TRIALS IN RED FORT

(Moti Ram ed. 1946) (hereinafter

RED
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the three accused were patriots fighting for the independence of
India under the leadership of the "Provisional Government of
Free India. ' 70 The "president" of this faction was Subhas Chandra Bose, 1 who was allegedly killed in a Japanese air crash
shortly before the liberation of Rangoon.
Not long before the trial was to commence, one of the accused reported sick and I was ordered to accompany him to the
hospital. Strangely enough for one who had renounced his loyalty to the British crown, he claimed he was entitled to be
treated at the British officers' hospital, rather than the one normally used by other Indian ranks. He then tried to suborn me by
appealing to my known sympathies for Indian independence,
and he also tried to find out what line the prosecution would be
taking at the forthcoming trial. I reminded him that his conduct
was not only improper, but that he was laying himself open to
further charges under the Indian Army Act, to which he was still
amenable as an officer in an Indian regiment despite his having
joined the INA. The defence conducted by Mr. Desai turned
largely on the form of the British surrender at Singapore, General Perceval's subsequent instruction to the Indian troops and
the political relations between the "Provisional Government of
Free India," the Japanese and other Axis powers which had extended recognition to them. In fact, at times one was inclined to
wonder whether what was taking place was a court-martial or a
series of lectures on various aspects of international law, in particular the conditions of statehood and recognition. To buttress
these arguments, a number of Japanese political and military
personnel in Allied hands, who were awaiting interrogation with,
a view to their own possible trials for war crimes, were brought
in as defence witnesses at the Indian government's expense, and
subsequently were returned to captivity in Japan for further
interrogation.
The presence of these witnesses necessitated the employment of Japanese interpreters. The defence insisted that these
interpreters were to be civilians rather than officers of the Intel-

" For documents relating to the "Provisional Government," see FORMATION
OF The Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj) (Singh ed. 1946).

AND

GROWTH

" For a biography of Bose, see H. ToYE,

THE SPRINGING TIGER:

A STUDY

OF A REVO-

LUTIONARY (1959).
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ligence Corps working in the various translation departments of
the armed forces. Fearing that the ability of these interpreters
might leave something to be desired, my Colonel required me to
sit with him as his personal interpreter to check that the translations of evidence were in fact correct. It did not take long to
persuade him that not only had I never learned to speak Japanese, but that much of my written Japanese had been lost
through non-usage.
Despite the highly political nature of this trial, the court
agreed with the prosecution's arguments that the accused had
remained commissioned officers of the Indian Army; they were
still bound by their oaths of allegiance; and they remained subject to the Indian Army Act. All three were duly sentenced to
death, but the Viceroy saw fit to pardon and release them.
After this "show trial"72 had taken place, my own case was
due for hearing. The accused were jointly charged with waging
war against the King, three charges of murder, two charges of
causing grievous hurt and two charges of abetment. When I prepared the charge sheet, the charges were listed with the most
serious offense, waging war, appearing first. Before the trial
opened, I was summoned by the Adjutant-General7" who was accompanied by the chief political advisor to the Government of
India. I was ordered, by instructions from the Viceroy, that my
charge sheet was to be amended so that the waging war charge
was to appear as the last charge on the sheet. The waging war
charge was responsible for the adverse political agitation by Indian political parties, both Congress and the Muslim League. I
reminded them that I was appearing against Indian counsel, that
waging war was the most serious charge that could be lodged
under the Indian Army Act and the Penal Code 74 and that the
Indian defence lawyers would consider that I had lost my sense
72 For apparently political reasons, the trial was held in the Red Fort in Delhi, the
place in which Bahadur Shah II, the last Mogul Emperor of India, had been tried and
sentenced to transportation for life in 1857. This trial occurred at the end of the Indian
Mutiny, now generally described in India as the Sepoy Rebellion. See RED FORT, supra
note 69, at 423.
" At that time, the Prosecution Section was part of the Adjutant General's Department of the Army.
" See Indian Army Act, 1911, supra note 7; INDIA PEN. CODE § 121 (1860) reprinted
in CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 550.
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of proportion if I were to proceed in this way. I was then told
that not only was the charge sheet to be set out in this way, but
no evidence was to be presented on this charge. My request for
permission to drop the charge was rejected, and I was instructed
to proceed. Since murder charges were involved, it was decided
that I should be led by one of India's most senior British
counsel.
This case presented interesting features which we had not
previously encountered. The murders and beatings were alleged
to have occurred during an attack on the Gurkha camp on 24
August, 1942, while the two charges of abetment related to
events in September. The waging war was alleged to have continued from September, 1942 through the end of April, 1943, although this charge was now somewhat irrelevant. Under § 67 of
the Indian Army Act7" there was a time bar of three years
preventing a trial by court-martial, save for a few specified offences-none of which was an issue in the present case. The
court-martial opened on 15 December, 1945, which was beyond
the statutory time limit. Exercising his powers under the Government of India Act, 1935,76 the Governor-General" promulgated an Ordinance amending § 67 to read:
No trial by court-martial of any person subject to this Act for any
offence, other than an offence committed after the 7th day of December, 1941, while the person in question was a prisoner of war
or was present in enemy territory, or an offence of mutiny, desertion or fraudulent enrollment shall be commenced after the expiration of three years (in the computation of which period time
spent by the person in question after the aforesaid date as a pris"' Indian Army Act, 1911, § 67, supra note 7.
" Under The Government of India Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 42, sch. 9, § 72:
The Governor-General may, in cases of emergency, make and promulgate ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof,
and any ordinance so made shall, for the space of not more than six months from
its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act passed by the Indian legisla-

ture; but the power of making ordinances under this section is subject to the like
restrictions as the power of the Indian legislature to make laws; and any ordinance
made under this section is subject to the like disallowance as an Act passed by the
Indian legislature, and may be controlled or superseded by any such Act.

Id.
The six month period requirement had been repealed by the India and Burma
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, 3 & 4 Geo. 6, ch. 33.
" The Viceroy was also Governor-General.
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oner of war or in enemy territory or in evading arrest shall be

excluded) from the date of such offence

. .

. [and] "enemy terri-

tory" means any area at the time of the presence therein of the
person in question under the sovereignty, or administered by, or
in the occupation of a State at that time at war with His
Majesty."a

It would appear that someone among the Governor-General's advisors had become aware of the line of defence that I
had presented on behalf of my Burma Frontier Force client and
made use of it now that it appeared it might be of benefit to the
prosecution.
Immediately the case commenced, and the defence played
the card that I had used in the past. The defence pleaded the
lack of jurisdiction. Defence counsel contended that the Ordinance was ultra vires on the ground that § 67 could not be
amended more than three years after the commission of the acts
alleged, that it was in any case retroactive and thus it was contrary to the rule of law as understood in Anglo-Indian jurisprudence. However, I persuaded my leader, the colonel, to respond
by arguing that the Ordinance did not revive a time-barred offence, but removed what was purely a time-barred procedural
limitation allowing a case to be tried by a court whose jurisdiction would otherwise have lapsed.79 Moreover, it was not until
the accused had been recovered by the British authorities that
there was any real potential for trial and I maintained that the
three year period should only be computed from such time as it
became feasible for proceedings to have been initiated.
The defence next contended that the terms of service which
existed at the time of a man's enlistment could not be altered
without his consent, particularly if he was on a term of years
enlistment, arguing in fact that there was a contractual relation8 Ordinance amending § 67 Indian Army Act, 1911, promulgated October 31, 1942,
Official Publication Number V8-111, available directly from the India Office-Library and
Records, 197 Black Friars Road, London, England, SE1 8NG; telephone number 81-9289531.
The 7th of December, 1941 was date of both the attack on Pearl Harbor and the
British declaration of war against Japan.
79 For similar contentions regarding the competence of the Israeli courts to try Eichmann, see Green, The Maxim Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann Trial, 38
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 457 (1963).
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ship between a soldier and his sovereign. This argument was met
with short shrift; the Judge Advocate pointed out that an enlistment engagement could not be construed as a contract of employment.8 0 It was further argued that, as had been seen during
the time of the "big trial" in the Red Fort when anti-British
demonstrations had taken place throughout Delhi, the trial itself
was likely to disrupt the peace and good government of India.
The amending Ordinance contributed to such disruption by permitting the trial, and it was therefore itself creative of emergency. The court held that it was solely within the GovernorGeneral's discretion to assess whether an emergency existed, to
take what steps were necessary to deal with it and that his assessment could not be questioned.
Finally, the defence did not know that evidence would not
be presented on the waging war charge; the defence argued that
this was a civil offence under the Indian Penal Code. Therefore,
it fell within the requirements of § 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that no court shall take cognizance of
any offence punishable under Chapter VI of the Indian Penal
Code (in which the waging war offence appears), unless upon
complaint made by order of, or under authority from the Provincial Government or some officer empowered by the Provincial
Government."
The Judge Advocate advised the Court to dismiss the plea
to the jurisdiction and his reasoning warrants recording:
The procedure of a court-martial is regulated by the Rules made
under the Indian Army Act, and these Rules contain no provisions equivalent to § 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This
Code does not apply to courts-martial except in so far as certain
sections of it have been specifically made applicable by the Indian
Army Act, or any other Act of the Indian Legislature. A courtmartial, unlike an ordinary criminal court, does not proceed upon
the complaint of anyone, nor does it, in my opinion, "take cognizance" of any offences. A court-martial is constituted by the convening order, and continues only so long as the particular matters
referred to it are undecided. It has no power to direct that any
person shall be tried before itself. Moreover, when a court-martial
8o For a similar U.S. holding, see Johnson v. Powell 414 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1969).
s' INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. §196 (1898) reprinted in CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at
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and an ordinary criminal court have concurrent jurisdiction to try
an offence, § 69 of the Indian Army Act gives direction to the
military authorities to determine by which court the offender will
be tried, and there is no restriction in this section requiring the
military authorities to obtain prior sanction from anyone. In my
opinion, therefore, § 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code is irrelevant to the present trial, as are the submissions of the learned
counsel for the defence based on this section. s2

The colonel and I now assumed that the trial would proceed. However, immediately after the court opened, the defence
counsel informed us that a Delhi sub-judge (magistrate) had issued an ex parte injunction against the members of the court,
the convening authority, the colonel and myself, and that pending a hearing, the court was without jurisdiction to proceed. The
colonel argued that the order of the civil court was null and
void, since an injunction "cannot be granted to stay a judicial
proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the
injunction is sought, unless such a restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings. . ...
,3 Because § 193 of the
Indian Penal Code provides that a trial before a court-martial is
a judicial proceeding,"4 there was no possibility of there being a
multiplicity of proceedings. Finally, he contended that the court
was concerned with a criminal matter, and "an injunction cannot be granted to stay proceedings in a criminal matter." The
Judge Advocate did not rule on these arguments, but recom82 This quotation is taken directly from the transcript at trial. The author has ex-

pressed his desire to maintain the anonymity of the defendants. For this reason, the
citation has been intentionally omitted. For clarification purposes, the pertinent statutes
are cited herein. See INDIA CODE CRIM. PROC. § 196 (1898) reprinted in CHAKRAVARTI,
supra note 8, at 143; The Indian Army Act, 1911, § 69, supra note 7. Compare with the
U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1988), which provide that
even "[a] serviceman on leave from duty and out of uniform could be tried by the military for the robbery of a civilian business establishment. While the civilian courts also
had jurisdiction to try the accused, this did not invalidate the military jurisdiction." D.
ZILLMAN, A. BLAUSTEIN, E. SHERMAN, D. FAW, M. LARKIN, J. MUNSTER, JR., J. PAUST, R.
PECKHAM & A. RAKAS, THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: CASES AND MATERIALS, § 3.02
(1978).
83 This quotation is also taken directly from the transcript at trial. The author has
expressed his desire to maintain the anonymity of the defendants. For this reason, the
citation has been intentionally omitted.
8 For clarification of the pertinent statute, see INDIA PEN. CODE § 193 (1860) (Explanation 1) reprinted in CHAKRAVARTI, supra note 8, at 595.
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mended an adjournment, "solely out of courtesy to the learned
judge who, in making the order which he did, was acting, after
all, in a judicial capacity." My leader and I then proceeded to
the magistrate's court to hear the claim for the grant of a permanent injunction against us. The judge dismissed the defence application on the technical grounds that the 60 days notice as required under § 80 of the Civil Procedure Code85 had not been
given to the military personnel concerned, and that the consent
of the Governor-General to institute the proceedings had not
been obtained as required under § 270(1) of the Government of
India Act. 6
By virtue of this decision, all obstacles in the way of proceeding with the trial were now removed and the court-martial
at last got under way. As we returned to the court, I received a
note from the senior defence counsel asking me to join him and
his colleagues in their retiring room. Upon doing so, I was first
asked why I was not proceeding with the waging war charge.
When I pointed out that I was a military officer carrying out
orders, they understood completely. To some extent my position
was vindicated when we learned, while this discussion was proceeding, that no further waging war charges were to be
presented. They next reminded me-as if this were necessary-that I was not an Indian lawyer and not expert in Indian
criminal law. They offered me the use of their library and any
technical advice that I might need. During the trial I had further
evidence of professional brotherhood, although this time on a
military as distinct from a legal level. I was walking through the
camp in which the INA personnel were held when I was approached by an INA major-general, a former lieutenant-colonel
in the British Indian Army. He asked if we might walk and talk.
He said: "Major Green, we know you are trying to put a rope
"

INDIA CODE CIV. PROC.

§ 80 (1908).

" Government of India Act,

1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 42, § 270(1) provides:
No proceedings civil or criminal shall be instituted against any person in respect
of any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty as a servant
of the Crown in India or Burma before the relevant date, except with the consent,
in the case of a person who was employed in connection with the affairs of the
Government of India of the affairs of Burma, of the Governor-General in his discretion, and in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of a
Province, of the Governor of that Province in his discretion.
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around our necks. If we get the chance, we'll put a knife in your
back." Thereafter, I always had a Gurkha covering my back
when walking through the camp.
One of my most important witnesses was the Gurkha
subedar-major previously referred to in relation to the "nonmurder" of his British officer.8 7 On the morning he was due to
give evidence he came and inquired what language he should use
in court. I reminded him that the language of the Indian Army
and of its courts-martial was English,88 although we would be
using two interpreters since the accused spoke two different Indian languages, that he himself held a Higher School certificate
in English and that he would have to make his own decision. I
rose to begin formal examination and he gave all the details of
his birth, military training and education in English, but as soon
as I asked my first substantive question he asked for a Gurkhali
interpreter. When the President referred to his English competence, the witness explained: "Brigadier sahib, men's lives depend upon my evidence. It is essential that I fully understand
every question that is put to me." Counsel on both sides were a
little distressed, for it now meant that every question would be
put in English, translated into Gurkhali and then translated into
the two languages of the accused. The witness would then be
required to answer in Gurkhali, his answer would be translated
into English and then translated into the languages of the accused. The prospects for satisfactory cross-examination were not
very good, nor were they improved by the number of occasions
when the witness answered the English question in English, and
had to be reminded that he was obliged to wait for the three
translations before replying.
The problem of the defence in relation to cross-examination
of Gurkha witnesses was further illustrated when I put on the
stand an uneducated sepoy who had lost an arm as a result of
the firing incident at the camp. He was the subject of one of the
grievous hurt charges. Defence counsel asked the witness to describe what had occurred on the day of the shooting, and the
87

See supra, text accompanying notes 64-66.

"' In fact, the INA found that its attempts to use Hindi as a lingua franca were a
dismal failure and rapidly reverted to English. For a definition of lingua franca, see
supra note 42, at 760.
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witness began to recount everything that had happened beginning with the sounding of reveille at 6 a.m. and proceeded with
an almost minute-by-minute account of his doings. Counsel
wanted to know about the firing which had occurred at about 3
p.m., and somewhat exasperated, he repeated his question only
to receive the same response. After this had happened four
times, the presiding Brigadier suggested that it was clear the
witness knew what had happened on the day in question, and if
we were to get on with the trial, perhaps it would be best if
counsel allowed him to tell his tale in his own way."'
While the trial was in progress I was informed that I had
been granted a Class-B Release90 in order to take up a teaching
appointment in international law at my old school, University
College London.
VI.
My connection with the Indian National Army did not terminate with my departure from the trial. The experience served
to provide material for the first public lecture I delivered as an
academic. Moreover, when I visited India in 1954 to attend an
International Law Association Conference, it was known that I
had been involved in the INA trials, and since INA personnel
were now regarded in independent India as national heroes, the
Government of India provided me with an armed bodyguard.
When I received a tea invitation from one of the defence counsel
in my last trial, I had the greatest difficulty in preventing my
escort from entering the house and staying with me. He made it
" I had one other experience with Gurkha witnesses. A number of them had been
recovered with the liberation of Rangoon and Singapore, and they had been brought to
Delhi as potential witnesses. One morning, my Colonel called me in and with a smile
informed me that they had accused me of crime against humanity and that I had better
go and find out what it was all about. I knew that while the Gurkhas had been in the
Japanese prison camp they had been on short rations, usually a small quantity of rice.
Because of this, thinking I was being magnanimous, I had given orders that they were to
be given meat. I had forgotten that their basic food was rice. Hence the complaint! My
apology was graciously accepted.
90 At the end of hostilities, releases from the Army (Class A) were normally based
on a points system depending on length of service. However, if a special case could be
made, an earlier release (Class B) could be secured. This was granted at the request of
those seeking to employ or otherwise secure the release of the concerned. It was not
granted at the person's request.
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clear that if I were not out in 45 minutes he would come in to
get me. At the presidential dinner for delegates he actually stood
behind my chair. While at University College, I was for some
years responsible for the admission of graduate students in law.
In 1956, an Indian student appeared, and after examining his
record I informed him that he was unqualified for admission. He
surprised me by stating, "But sir, you owe me special consideration." When I asked the reason, I was told "During the war you
tried to hang my uncle"-as indeed I had, but I fear that this
argument in no way made up for his lack of qualifications. As
late as 1958 I had further evidence that my role in the INA affair had not been forgotten. I was in New York for an international law conference when an Indian lawyer greeted me. He was
P.K. Roy, senior legal counsel to the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and had been the chief civilian lawyer advising the Indian government authorities on the trials while I
was with the Prosecution Section. We remained friends until he
returned to India from Montreal on his retirement from the
ICAO. Then, in 1972, after delivering a lecture in the Delhi bar
library on war crimes, an Indian lawyer asked me if it was my
first time in India. I told him that I had already been there three
or four times, and he replied, "Yes Major Green, British Army
1944-46." I asked him how he knew, and it transpired he had
been a junior defence counsel in the case I had been prosecuting
when I left for home.
Even when my wife and I were on embarkation leave awaiting repatriation to England I discovered that my "reputation" as
a military lawyer was well known. While our ship was in dock
waiting to sail, the Officer Commanding Troops (O.C.) sent for
me and informed me that I was to take a summary of evidence
against the ship's Adjutant. Apparently, the O.C. had given orders that his administrative staff was not to fraternize with the
crew, who were Merchant Navy and not under military command. The Adjutant had done so, and I was amazed to find that
when we sailed he had been left behind under close arrest on a
charge of disobeying orders, with my summary of evidence as
the basis of the charge against him.
I was still not finished. The O.C. sent for me and ordered
me to take a summary of evidence arising from a charge against
a corporal who was alleged to have struck a sergeant major.
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Once again my wife acted as secretary. The facts were intriguing.
It was a family ship which was somewhat crowded. The corporal
was married to an Anglo-Indian and the sergeant major to an
Anglo-Burmese, both of whom were in the same cabin, as were
their children. The corporal's wife entered the cabin to find the
other lady's son by a previous marriage going through her suitcase. She accused him of stealing cigarettes, she called him a
thief and cast doubts on his legitimacy as well as the respectability of the sergeant major's wife. A fight between the two women
ensued, in the course of which one threw a thermos of boiling
water over the other. The husbands intervened and tried to separate the fighting women. It was in the course of this effort that
the alleged blow was struck. During the taking of the summary I
learned a great deal of army language and Anglo-Saxon and
other curses used in a variety of forms that I had never dreamed
possible. I told my wife not to include the riper of these in the
record. As a result, neither woman was willing to sign the summary as a true record of what had happened. It took a great deal
of arguing on my part before they were convinced that at any
trial that ensued they would be able to give their evidence as
fully as they liked and in words of their own choosing. I explained that, for the purposes of a court-martial, the summary
was in fact just that, and by no means intended as a verbatim
record of everything said. Eventually they were convinced, and I
felt that I could now treat the rest of the voyage as a holiday
pending disembarkation in Scotland. However, I had forgotten
the nature of the O.C.
Since the ship was carrying wives and children and was
fairly crowded, orders had been issued forbidding smoking between decks. This ruling was perhaps more observed in the
breach than otherwise and in due course I was summoned again.
The O.C. informed me that two sergeants, who had been in the
Army for the entire length of the war and both of whom had
excellent records, had disobeyed the order and I was to organize
the taking of a summary of evidence and then preside over the
subsequent court-martial. I tried to persuade him that this could
be dealt with by the most summary of procedures before himself, and that it was hard on men proceeding home for discharge
to be faced with what might be a stain on an otherwise clean
military record. However, he was adamant. On checking the
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British Manual91 I found that I had not held my commission
long enough to serve as the president of a court-martial, so I was
instructed to serve as prosecuting officer. The court was to be
comprised of a single officer who had previously been a member
of a court-martial, while the defence was in the hands of a Royal
Air Force officer who had been a solicitor in civil life. The O.C.
did make one concession. He agreed that the trial would be held
in the Warrant Officers' lounge, and it would be open to anyone
wishing to attend. The evidence against the two was clear, but
the President considered a reprimand sufficient punishment. My
only consolation was that when the trial was over the two accused thanked me for a fair deal, while other NCOs, who had
watched the proceedings, expressed the opinion that if that was
how army justice was conducted, they hoped that if they ever
came before a court after demobilization they were afforded an
equally fair trial.
Even when I went to Singapore in 1960 as Professor of International Law, I found that my notoriety as an army lawyer
involved with the INA had preceded me. When I was introduced
to local members of faculty, two of them told me that they had
been a little concerned about my joining the University staff
since they had been locally recruited as doctors in the Indian
National Army and were not sure how I would react. In fact, we
became friends. More intriguing was the call I received from the
Colonel in charge of the Judge Advocate General's Department.
He inquired whether I was on the Reserve of Officers and
whether I still possessed my uniform. I answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. He stated
that he was sure that a uniform could be found for me. In replying to my inquiry as to what this was all about, he informed me
that he was initiating a court-martial against a captain and
wanted me to defend on the condition that if I lost I would appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeal Board and ultimately to the
House of Lords. Apparently, in view of the Indonesian "konfrontasi,"92 Singapore was an active duty station and any officer
supra note 4, at 46.
When Malaysia was established in 1963, Indonesia condemned it as a British imperialist creation and instituted a "confrontation" involving the infiltration of Malaysia
and Singapore of armed infiltrators. See, e.g., Public Prosecutor v. Koi 119681 A.C. 829;
"

MANUAL,

92
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to marry required his commander's permission. The officer in
question wished to marry a lady who was suspected of being a
Communist agent, and he had made it clear that the marriage
would go ahead regardless of the views of his commanding officer. I suggested that the matter could be settled quietly by arranging for the officer to be posted away from Singapore. However, the Judge Advocate's Department wanted to have the case
treated as a test case. They were convinced that the requirement
of consent in the case of an officer of mature years was illegal,
and they wanted it overturned. They felt sure that the court
would uphold the order, but that on appeal it would almost certainly be thrown out. The thought of once again being in unialmost certainly securing a free trip to
form-and
London-appealed to me and I agreed to defend. I was rather
annoyed when I received a call two days later to inform me that
my potential client had "broken off his engagement," and my
services would therefore not be required!
CONCLUSION

In the long run I suppose I can say that, even though I
started knowing little about Indian military or criminal law and
even less about legal practice, I did not fare badly and I learned
a great deal. I also have the satisfaction of knowing that I am
one of the few lawyers who has had the opportunity to both defend and prosecute charges of treason-while not yet twenty-five
years old! Perhaps far more important is the fact that this wartime experience led to my interest in terrorism and, more significantly, to my specialising in the law of armed conflict. This has
resulted in: My serving as legal advisor to the Canadian delegation to the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed
Conflicts from 1975 to 1977;" 3 lecturing to legal officers in the
Canadian Armed Forces; preparing the first draft of the Canadian Manual of Armed Conflict Law;91 publishing my own Su[1968] 2 W.L.R. 715; [19681 1 All E.R. 419, P.C. See also Mohamed Ali and Another v.
Public Prosecutor (19691 1 A.C. 430; [19681 3 W.L.R. 1076; [19681 3 All E.R. 488, P.C.
9' Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 10 June, 1977, re-

printed in
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& TOMAN, supra note 12, at 605.
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perior Orders in National and InternationalLaw9" and Essays
on the Modern Law of War." It may well be that my experience
as a simple graduate in the law with international law as one of
his degree subjects may serve to encourage others should the
need arise.

95 L. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976).
98 L. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR (1985).
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